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PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 16-1555 
____________ 
 
BOBBIE JAMES, on behalf of themselves and  
 all others similarly situated;  
 CRYSTAL GIBSON, on behalf of themselves and  
 all others similarly situated;  
 BETTY KING, on behalf of themselves and all  
 others similarly situated;  
 BARBARA SKLADANY, on behalf of themselves and  
 all others similarly situated; 
 MARK SKLADANY, on behalf of themselves and  
 all others similarly situated;  
 MILAN SKLADANY, on behalf of themselves and all  
 others similarly situated;  
 DR. JOHN F. CROW, on behalf of themselves and  
 all others similarly situated 
v. 
 
 GLOBAL TELLINK CORP;  
 INMATE TELEPHONE SERVICE; DSI ITI LLC 
 
      Global TelLink Corporation and DSI-ITI LLC, 
 
                          Appellants 
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____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 2-13-cv-04989) 
District Judge: Honorable William J. Martini 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
November 3, 2016 
 
Before: CHAGARES, HARDIMAN, and SCIRICA, 
Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: March 29, 2017) 
 
 
 
James E. Cecchi, Esq. 
Lindsey H. Taylor, Esq. 
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Roseland, NJ 07068 
 
James A. Plaisted, Esq. 
Lin C. Solomon, Esq. 
Pashman Stein Walder Hayden 
21 Main Street 
Hackensack, NJ 07601 
 
 Counsel for Plaintiffs-Appellees 
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Robert J. Herrington, Esq. 
Greenberg Traurig 
1840 Century Park East 
Suite 1900 
Los Angeles, CA 90067 
 
 
Philip R. Sellinger, Esq. 
Aaron Van Nostrand, Esq. 
Greenberg Traurig 
500 Campus Drive, Suite 400 
Florham Park, NJ 07932 
 
 Counsel for Defendants-Appellants 
 
____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge 
Global Tel*Link Corporation, Inmate Telephone Service, 
and DSI-ITI LLC (collectively, GTL), appeal the District 
Court’s order denying their motion to compel arbitration against 
Bobbie James and other putative class action plaintiffs who used 
GTL’s prison phone services. The question presented is whether 
Appellees agreed to be bound by the terms of use contained on 
GTL’s website, even though they never visited it. Because the 
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District Court properly held that Appellees did not agree to 
arbitrate, we will affirm. 
 
I 
GTL provides telecommunications services that enable 
inmates at state and local correctional facilities to call family, 
friends, attorneys, and other approved persons outside the 
prisons. GTL is the sole provider of these services in New 
Jersey. Users can sign up for an account and deposit funds either 
through GTL’s website or through an automated telephone 
service that uses an interactive voice-response system with 
standardized scripts and prompts. 
 People who create an account through the website are 
shown a copy of GTL’s terms of use and must click a button that 
says “Accept” to complete the process. Those who create an 
account by telephone receive the following audio notice: 
Please note that your account, and 
any transactions you complete . . . 
are governed by the terms of use 
and the privacy statement posted at 
www.offenderconnect.com. The 
terms of use and the privacy 
statement were most recently 
revised on July 3, 2013. 
App. 125. Unlike web users, those who set up accounts by 
telephone are not required to indicate their assent to the terms of 
use. 
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 GTL’s terms of use contain an arbitration agreement and 
a class-action waiver, and users have 30 days to opt out of both 
of these provisions. They also state that using the telephone 
service or clicking the “Accept” button on the website 
constitutes acceptance of the terms, and users have 30 days to 
cancel their accounts if they do not agree to the terms. 
 Plaintiffs in this case are inmates and their relatives or 
friends who used GTL’s services. Four of them opened accounts 
by telephone, and one opened an account through GTL’s 
website.1 In August 2013, Plaintiffs filed a putative class action 
alleging that GTL’s charges were unconscionable. They alleged 
violations of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, the Federal 
Communications Act (FCA), the Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment, and various New Jersey state laws. GTL moved to 
dismiss or stay the matter, arguing that the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) had primary jurisdiction. 
In September 2014, the District Court stayed the case until either 
the FCC made a determination or Plaintiffs withdrew their 
claims arising under the FCA. Plaintiffs decided to withdraw 
their FCA claims. 
 GTL answered the complaint in November 2014 and 
filed an amended answer in March 2015, asserting as an 
affirmative defense that some of the Plaintiffs’ claims were 
subject to binding arbitration. GTL moved to compel arbitration 
five months later. 
                                                 
1 Bobbie James, Betty King, Barbara Skladany, and 
Milan Skladany opened accounts by telephone, and Crystal 
Gibson opened an account through the website. It is unclear how 
John Crow and Mark Skladany opened accounts. 
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 The District Court denied GTL’s motion to compel 
arbitration with respect to Plaintiffs who opened accounts by 
telephone.2 The Court found that, although Plaintiffs were 
notified that GTL’s service was “governed by the terms of use,” 
they were not informed that “use of the service alone constituted 
an acceptance of these terms.” James v. Global Tel*Link Corp., 
2016 WL 589676, at *7 (D.N.J. Feb. 11, 2006). They therefore 
“had neither the knowledge nor intent necessary to provide 
‘unqualified acceptance.’” Id. (citation omitted). “Consequently, 
without an understanding that they were accepting to be bound 
by the [terms of use], which included an agreement to arbitrate, 
there was no ‘legally enforceable contract’ created between 
GTL and the Plaintiffs.” Id. GTL filed this timely appeal. 
II 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1331 and 1332(d). We have jurisdiction to review the District 
Court’s order denying GTL’s motion to compel arbitration under 
the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(B). “We 
exercise plenary review over questions regarding the validity 
and enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate.” Puleo v. Chase 
Bank USA, N.A., 605 F.3d 172, 177 (3d Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
III 
                                                 
2 The Court granted the motion with respect to plaintiff 
Crystal Gibson, who opened her account online. Gibson was 
required to arbitrate her claims because she was presented with 
all the terms of use on the computer screen, including the 
arbitration provision, and provided her assent by clicking the 
“Accept” button. 
 
7 
 
 The FAA requires district courts to stay judicial 
proceedings and compel arbitration of claims covered by a 
written and enforceable arbitration agreement. 9 U.S.C. § 3. 
Thus, the first question is whether a valid arbitration agreement 
exists. Id. § 4. “Arbitration is a matter of contract between the 
parties and a judicial mandate to arbitrate must be predicated 
upon an agreement to that effect.” Par-Knit Mills, Inc. v. 
Stockbridge Fabrics Co., 636 F.2d 51, 54 (3d Cir. 1980). “[T]he 
FAA does not require parties to arbitrate when they have not 
agreed to do so.” Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland 
Stanford Jr. Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989). 
A 
 To determine whether a valid arbitration agreement 
exists, we “apply ordinary state-law principles that govern the 
formation of contracts.” First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 
514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995). Here, the District Court held that 
New Jersey law governs the question of contract formation, and 
the parties have not challenged that determination. 
Under New Jersey law, “[a]n agreement to arbitrate, like 
any other contract, must be the product of mutual assent, as 
determined under customary principles of contract law.” Atalese 
v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp., L.P., 99 A.3d 306, 312–13 (N.J. 2014) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted), cert. denied, 135 
S. Ct. 2804 (2015). “Mutual assent requires that the parties have 
an understanding of the terms to which they have agreed.” Id. at 
313. As the New Jersey Supreme Court explained, this principle 
is especially important in arbitration cases. “[B]ecause 
arbitration involves a waiver of the right to pursue a case in a 
judicial forum, courts take particular care in assuring the 
knowing assent of both parties to arbitrate, and a clear mutual 
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understanding of the ramifications of that assent.” Id. (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). 
To manifest assent, an offeree must provide “unqualified 
acceptance,” which can be express or implied by conduct. 
Weichert Co. Realtors v. Ryan, 608 A.2d 280, 284 (N.J. 1992) 
(citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 19(1) (1981)). 
“Silence does not ordinarily manifest assent, but the 
relationships between the parties or other circumstances may 
justify the offeror’s expecting a reply and, therefore, assuming 
that silence indicates assent to the proposal.” Id. Nevertheless, 
the offeror must “give[] the offeree reason to understand that 
assent may be manifested by silence or inaction.” Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts § 69 (1981). New Jersey law also 
recognizes that contract terms may be incorporated by reference. 
“In order for there to be a proper and enforceable incorporation 
by reference of a separate document . . . the party to be bound by 
the terms must have had knowledge of and assented to the 
incorporated terms.” Alpert, Goldberg, Butler, Norton & Weiss, 
P.C. v. Quinn, 983 A.2d 604, 617 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
B 
 The parties have not cited and we are unaware of any 
decisions that address the issue of contract formation through an 
interactive voice-response telephone system. In this case, GTL 
informed telephone users each time they set up or deposited 
funds in their accounts that its service was governed by terms of 
use available on its website. However, users were not required 
to visit the website or demonstrate acceptance of the terms of 
use through any affirmative act. Nor were they notified by the 
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automated telephone service that their use of GTL’s service 
would constitute assent to the terms of use.  
 GTL argues that Appellees manifested assent by using its 
services after being repeatedly informed that their accounts were 
governed by its terms of use. In support of its argument, GTL 
relies on several cases finding assent to contract terms through 
use of a product or service. But in those cases, the purchasers 
manifested assent through the affirmative act of signing 
contracts that contained arbitration provisions. See, e.g., Raynor 
v. Verizon Wireless (VAW), LLC, 2016 WL 1626020, at *3–4 
(D.N.J. Apr. 25, 2016) (enforcing arbitration agreement where 
customer physically signed agreement containing arbitration 
clause and activated cell phone service); Curtis v. Cellco P’ship, 
992 A.2d 795, 797–800 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010) 
(enforcing arbitration agreement where customer electronically 
signed agreement containing arbitration clause before activating 
wireless phone service plan). Unlike those cases, Appellees here 
never signed anything when they opened their accounts or 
deposited money, let alone an agreement containing an 
arbitration provision. 
GTL also relies on a number of cases in which consumers 
purchased goods or services online and were found to have 
assented to the terms and conditions available by hyperlink. See, 
e.g., Snap-on Bus. Sols. Inc. v. O’Neil & Assocs., 708 F. Supp. 
2d 669, 683 (N.D. Ohio 2010); PDC Labs. v. Hach Co., 2009 
WL 2605270, at *3 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 25, 2009); Hubbert v. Dell 
Corp., 835 N.E.2d 113, 121–22 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). In each of 
those cases, the terms and conditions were immediately 
accessible to online users. By contrast, the transactions between 
GTL and Appellees occurred entirely through an automated 
telephone system, a medium that adverted to the terms of use 
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without stating them. To access the terms of use, Appellees 
would have needed to connect to the internet, visit GTL’s 
website, and then click on a hyperlink. No Appellee took those 
extra steps. 
GTL’s reliance on Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 
U.S. 585 (1991), is likewise misplaced. There, the Supreme 
Court held that a forum-selection clause printed on a cruise 
ticket was valid and enforceable. Id. at 594–95. In contrast to 
this appeal, plaintiffs in Carnival Cruise received a copy of the 
contract with their tickets and conceded that they had notice of 
the forum-selection clause before contracting for passage. Id. at 
590. Here, Appellees were never presented with the terms 
available on GTL’s website and therefore were unaware of the 
arbitration provision contained therein. 
GTL also relies on decisions enforcing contract terms 
that consumers do not receive until after completing their 
purchases. These are known as “shrinkwrap-license” cases 
because of the plastic that is used to seal products such as 
computer software. See Schnabel v. Trilegiant Corp., 697 F.3d 
110, 121 & n.10 (2d Cir. 2012). In these cases, the license terms 
are typically provided inside the packaging, and consumers are 
deemed to accept those terms by opening or using the products. 
Id. at 122. Unlike this appeal, however, the consumers in the 
shrinkwrap-license cases received physical copies of the terms 
and conditions upon opening the products, and their subsequent 
use of the products manifested assent to the enclosed terms. See, 
e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(holding that terms inside a software box bind consumers who 
use the software after an opportunity to read the terms and reject 
them by returning the product). 
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C 
 This appeal presents an unusual hybrid of technology—
offering services via one medium (an interactive telephone 
voice-response system) and purporting to bind users of those 
services to terms that are accessible only through a different 
medium (the internet). Because of the technology involved, 
particularly the internet, the District Court analogized GTL’s 
method of notice and assent to that used in online “browsewrap” 
agreements. See James, 2016 WL 589676, at *5. In browsewrap 
agreements, a company’s terms and conditions are generally 
posted on a website via hyperlink at the bottom of the screen. 
Unlike online agreements where users must click on an 
acceptance after being presented with terms and conditions 
(known as “clickwrap” agreements), browsewrap agreements do 
not require users to expressly manifest assent. See Nicosia v. 
Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220, 233 (2d Cir. 2016).  
There is an evolving body of caselaw regarding whether 
the terms and conditions in browsewrap agreements are 
enforceable, often turning on whether the terms or a hyperlink to 
the terms are reasonably conspicuous on the webpage. See, e.g., 
id.; Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1177 (9th 
Cir. 2014); Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 
30–32 (2d Cir. 2002); Hoffman v. Supplements Togo Mgmt., 
LLC, 18 A.3d 210, 218–20 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011). 
When terms are linked in obscure sections of a webpage that 
users are unlikely to see, courts have refused to find constructive 
notice. See Nicosia, 834 F.3d at 233; Specht, 306 F.3d at 30–32. 
On the other hand, “where the website contains an explicit 
textual notice that continued use will act as a manifestation of 
the user’s intent to be bound, courts have been more amenable 
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to enforcing browsewrap agreements.” Nguyen, 763 F.3d at 
1177. 
Here we need not consider the particular design and 
content of GTL’s website because Appellees’ transaction with 
GTL occurred over the telephone. They neither received GTL’s 
terms of use, nor were they informed that merely using GTL’s 
telephone service would constitute assent to those terms.3 Under 
these circumstances, Appellees did not assent to the terms of use 
or the arbitration provision contained therein. See, e.g., 
Schnabel, 697 F.3d at 127 (finding no assent where arbitration 
provision “was both temporally and spatially decoupled from the 
plaintiffs’ enrollment in and use of” the service). Accordingly, 
the District Court properly held that Appellees cannot be 
required to arbitrate their claims. See Par-Knit Mills, 636 F.2d at 
54 (“Before a party to a lawsuit can be ordered to arbitrate and 
thus be deprived of a day in court, there should be an express, 
unequivocal agreement to that effect.”).  
                                                 
3 As GTL points out and the District Court recognized, 
the company’s terms of use do state that using the telephone 
service would constitute acceptance of those terms. But those 
terms were neither conspicuous nor readily accessible by 
Appellees, and we cannot say that by their actions they 
manifested assent to terms contained on a website they never 
visited. See Nguyen, 763 F.3d at 1179 (“Given the breadth of the 
range of technological savvy of online purchasers, consumers 
cannot be expected to ferret out hyperlinks to terms and 
conditions to which they have no reason to suspect they will be 
bound.”). 
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* * * 
Congress has made clear that arbitration is an important 
federal policy and the Supreme Court has vindicated that policy 
many times. Yet it remains axiomatic that a party cannot be 
required to arbitrate without its assent. On the facts as pleaded in 
this case, Appellees did not, through their words or deeds, agree 
to arbitrate their dispute with GTL. For that reason, we will 
affirm the order of the District Court denying GTL’s motion to 
compel arbitration. 
